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Malaria in American Troops in the
South and Southwest Pacific in World War II
ROBERT J T JOY*
The control of infectious or communicable diseases generally demands in whole or in
part management of the environment (water chlorination), law (immunization of school
children), behaviour modification (safe sex), drugs (antibiotics, vaccines), and education
or propaganda (television, posters).
The eventual control of malaria in the South Pacific (SOPAC) and Southwest Pacific
Area (SWPA) theatres in World War II required the application in combat of all these
variables. It is an exemplary tale ofthe importance ofmedical research before and during
a war and-more importantly-of the absolute necessity of combat commanders
understanding medical advice and applying it through the command chain with military
discipline. The reduction of malaria cases is a multi-factorial process. Military personnel
must take the prophylactic drugs, use insect repellent, observe clothing discipline, and use
bed nets where possible. Dedicated engineering, entomological and preventive medicine
units must determine the significant mosquito vectors and destroy their breeding places,
define any reservoirs in native inhabitants, and educate troops and their commanders.
Civil affairs and medical units must assist in the treatment of any native reservoirs and
advise command on the use of native labour as a transmission risk.
Malaria was endemic to hyper-endemic in SOPAC and SWPA. It took three
campaigns-Bataan, New Guinea and Guadalcanal-to demonstrate what a force
destroyer this single disease was. As soon as combat commanders understood what a force
multiplier malaria control could be, the resources and command support were given
without stint.
This paper discusses the operational and medical aspects ofmalaria in American forces.
The lessons apply equally to the Australian army; their story is splendidly told elsewhere.1
Ofnecessity, the tactical and operational background must be sketched in. Those soldiers
and marines were not in the jungles by choice; it was a war that put them there, it was a
warthat exposed them to malaria, and it was a warthat forced the application ofpeacetime
knowledge, and wartime research that eventually solved the military medical problem.
*Robert J T Joy, Emeritus Professor, Department of Broscious formanuscript organization and preparation.
Medical History, Uniformed Services University of
the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD 20814. Allan S Walker, The island campaigns, Australia
in the War of 1939-45, series 5 (medical), Canberra,
A shorter illustrated version ofthis paper was Australian War Memorial, 1957. The American
presented at a conference on 'The History ofMalaria equivalent is Medical Department, United States
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The American army had last dealt with malaria during a war in its campaigns in the
Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century.2 In the United States, malaria had
gradually disappeared except for vivax malaria3 in some areas of the rural South.4 The
comments ofPerrin Long, an experienced infectious disease and tropical medicine expert
from Johns Hopkins, are worth citing. "The majority of physicians entering the Armed
Forces had had practically no experience in the diagnosis or treatment of malaria. The
average younger American physician, except in certain rural areas in the Southern United
States, hardly gave a thought to malaria and was unconcerned about his lack ofknowledge
ofthis disease".5 In short, few American physicians had any experience with the disease,
even those in the regular army.
Bataan
The great disaster of American armies in the Philippines in early 1942 was due in part
to General Douglas MacArthur's last minute change in operations that led to the
previously planned but now hastily extemporized retreat to Bataan.6 That peninsula was
known to be a major reservoir of malaria. The Philippines were estimated to have one to
two million cases at all times. Incomplete data, for 1938 recorded 76,193 new cases with
9,427 deaths.7 On Bataan, quinine was in short supply and used only for treatment; the
nature of the terrain prevented the application of mosquito control measures, and
command direction of personnel protection was not enforced. Malaria and dysentery,
coupled with starvation and lack of supplies and reinforcements, led to the inevitable
surrender on 9 April 1942 of a sick and starving army deprived of the bare necessities
required for survival, to say nothing of combat.8
2 Mary C Gillett, The Army Medical Department,
1865-1917, Washington, DC, Center of Military
History, USGPO, 1995, pp. 201-20.
3 There are four Plasmodium species of clinical
interest; of these only two-vivax (relatively benign)
andfalciparum (relatively malignant)-are of major
importance. Drug resistance has become more and
more common infalciparum, less so in vivax. Both
are transmitted by various species of the female
Anopheline mosquito. For further detail see, Mary
Pudney, 'Antimalarials: from quinine to atovaquone',
in P A Hunter, G K Darby and N J Russell (eds),
Fifty years ofantimicrobials: pastperspectives and
future trends, Cambridge University Press, 1995,
pp. 229-47. For a general discussion of malaria, see
G Thomas Strickland, 'Malaria', in G Thomas
Strickland (ed.), Tropical medicine, Philadelphia,
W B Saunders, 1991, pp. 586-617.
4 Erwin H Ackerknecht, Malaria in the upper
Mississippi valley, 1760-1900, Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins Press, 1945; Ernest C Faust, 'Clinical and
public health aspects of malaria in the United States
from a historical perspective', Am. J. Trop. Med.,
1945, 25: 185-201.
5 Perrin H Long, 'Treatment ofmalaria', in
Medical Department, United States Army, Internal
medicine in World War II, vol. II, Infectious diseases,
eds John B Coates and W Paul Havens, Jr,
Washington, DC, Office of the Surgeon General,
USGPO, 1963, p. 493.
6 See Gavin Long, MacArthur as militarv
commander, New York, Van Nostrand, 1969, for an
overview; for detailed discussion see Louis Morton,
Thefall ofthe Philippines, Washington, DC, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army,
USGPO, 1953, pp. 161-89. A critical view is in
Stanley L Falk, 'Douglas MacArthur and the war
against Japan', in William L Leary, We shall return!
MacArthur's commanders and the defeat ofJapan,
Louisville, University Press of Kentucky, 1988,
pp. 1-22.
7 Paul F Russell, Malaria and culicidae in the
Philippine Islands, Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1934.
For later data, see James S Simmons, Tom F
Whayne, Gaylord W Anderson, and Harold M
Horack, Global epidemiology, Philadelphia,
Lippincott, 1944, vol. I, p. 414. ("Spleen rate" means
examining people for enlarged spleens which are
attributed to chronic malaria-true in nearly all
cases.)
8 Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, 'U.S. Army medical
preparations and the outbreak of war: the Philippines,
1941-6 May 1942', J. mil. Hist., 1992, 56: 35-56.
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MacArthur had escaped to Australia in March of 1942 and had assumed command of
allied forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. The Japanese made four attempts to seize Port
Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea for use as a staging base to stop the flow
of American forces to Australia. Two American-Japanese naval battles, Coral Sea (4-8
May, which stopped the amphibious invasion of Moresby) and Midway (4 June, which
severely damaged Japanese carrier strength), and two land battles-at Milne Bay (August)
and at Imita Ridge (September)-found the Australian Army victorious, although
severely assailed by malaria, which also crippled the Japanese attackers.9
Papua New Guinea
Allied operations moved to the offensive in New Guinea in October and November
1942, with the objective of taking Buna-Gona on the north coast, then capturing or
building airfields by a series of amphibious landings to the northwest in Papua New
Guinea to secure bases for the return to the Philippines. American and Australian troops
moved from Port Moresby by sea and air and overland across the Owen Stanley
mountains.
The battle was a "near-run thing" for the Americans. An untrained division,
incompetent and unskilled leadership, bad intelligence, and jungle-wise and dug-in
Japanese defenders all presented obstacles that were barely overcome.10 The battle was
fought in a malaria hyper-endemic area. While there can only be estimates of the
prevalence of malaria in New Guinea, spleen rates ranged from 25 per cent to 100 per
cent, and 15 per cent of non-native hospital admissions were for malaria. I1
The allied force was nearly destroyed by the disease. MacArthur was desperate (he had
already announced an immediate victory and the TORCH landings in North Africa were
getting the publicity). He sent Lieutenant General Robert L Eichelberger to Buna with an
order "to take Buna or not come back alive". At Buna, Eichelberger found an
undisciplined, defeated, dispirited, and sick division. The 200-man rifle companies were
down to 65 men, and all were febrile. He relieved officers, inspired the troops, reorganized
the battle, worked more closely with the Australians, invigorated the logistics system, and
by January 1943 had defeated the starving, malaria-ridden Japanese defenders.12
The disease costs of those months of early combat in Papua New Guinea are vividly
illustrated in Table 1. Japanese losses due to malaria are difficult to quantify. There is
some evidence that at Buna about 45 per cent of their malaria cases died, perhaps 55 per
cent of their wounded, and "an astonishing 60% of their patients with dysentery and
enteritis" died.13 Captured Japanese documents permit some comparison with American
9 Walker, op. cit., note I above, pp. 6-57. 1 Simmons. et al., op. cit., note 7 above, pp.
10 For the New Guinea campaign see Lida Mayo, 402-3.
Bloody Buna, New York, Doubleday, 1974; Jay 12 Quote from Jay Luvaas, Dear Miss Em: General
Luvaas, 'Buna: a Leavenworth nightmare', in Eichelberger s war in the Pacific, Westport, CN,
Charles E Heller and William A Stofft (eds), Greenwood Press, 1973, p. 32; Robert L
America sfirst battles, Lawrence, KS, University Eichelberger, Ourjungle road to Tokyo, New York,
Press of Kansas, 1986, pp. 186-225, and Samuel Doubleday, 1950, pp. 2-44.
Milner, Victory in Papua, Washington, DC, Office of 1' Albert E Cowdrey, Fighting for life: American
the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, military medicine in World War 11, New York, Free
USGPO, 1957. Press, 1994, p. 76.
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Table I
Casualties in Papua New Guinea
Troops Tropical Diseases Malaria Battle Casualties
Australian 29,101 21,600 6,154
American 8,259 6,292 1,598
Total 37,360 27,892 7,752
These data are for 1942, including the Milne Bay, Owen Stanley and Buna campaigns. it is clear
that the Australians bore the brunt of the fighting. Overall, tropical diseases were 4.8:1 to battle
casualties with the malaria ratio 3.6:1.
(Source: Allan S Walker, The island campaigns, Australia in the War of 1939-45, series 5
(Medical), Canberra, Australia War Memorial, 1957, pp. 121-2.)
Forces in February 1943. The Japanese on Rabaul (not fighting) had a malaria rate of
1,440/1000/year compared with the US rate of 718/1000 in New Guinea. Total Japanese
hospital admissions for malaria were 4,086/1000 in contrast to about 2,000/1000 for the
Americans.14
Guadalcanal
There had been another battle occurring while the New Guinea battles were raging. In
July 1942, intelligence surveys revealed that the Japanese were building an airfield on
Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands group. If it were allowed to become operational, the
Japanese would be able to block the sea lanes between the United States and Australia.
This area was under United States Navy command and was called the South Pacific Area
(SOPAC). Aircraft under MacArthur's SWPA air force collaborated in support ofthe fight
for Guadalcanal.
On 7 August 1942, the First Division of the United States Marine Corps made an
unopposed landing on Guadalcanal and secured the airfield. For the next seven months
marine and army units would receive ferocious attacks from reinforced Japanese forces
and the Japanese navy would essentially dominate the surrounding sea for several
months.15
Once again, the choice ofa battle area was in malaria hyper-endemic terrain. As in New
Guinea, the prevalence of malaria before the war can only be estimated. In Guadalcanal
spleen rates averaged about 80 per cent and between 10 and 20 per cent of hospital
admissions were for malaria.16
14 Thomas A Hart and William H Hardenbergh, history. See also, John Miller, Jr, Guadalcanal: the
'The southwest Pacific area', in Preventive medicine first offensive, Washington, DC, Office of the Chief
in World War 11, op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 573-5. of Military History, Dept. of the Army, USGPO,
15 Richard B Frank, Guadalcanal: the definitive 1949.
account ofthe landmark battle, New York, Random 16 Simmons, et al., op. cit., note 7 above, p. 451.
House. 1990, is the best recent military and naval
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Malaria-Guadalcanal
August
1942 1943 1944
Figure 1: Malaria admission rates on Guadalcanal for Marine and army forces.
(Source: Paul A Harper, et al., 'New Hebrides, Solomon Islands, Saint Matthias Group and Ryukyu
Islands', in Medical Department, United States Army, Preventive medicine in World WarII, vol. VI,
eds John B Coates and Ebbe C Hoff, Washington, DC, Office of the Surgeon General, 1963.)
Malaria was the single most serious and common cause of morbidity. By November
over 12 per cent of the marine division was ineffective from malaria, soon with a rate of
over 1500/1000/year. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, the division commander,
issued an "informal" order that no Marine would be excused from the line orpatrol unless
his temperature was greater than 103oF.17
The Japanese finally evacuated the island in early February 1943; except for mopping
up holdout survivors, Guadalcanal had been taken. Japanese losses to malaria are again
difficult to quantify. On Guadalcanal, their logistic system collapsed and the troops
starved. By the time they evacuated the island, about 65 per cent of their total estimated
force (33,600-44,000) was dead. Perhaps 30 per cent died ofdisease-malaria, dysentery,
beriberi, and starvation.18
17 Frank 0 Hough, Verle E Ludwig and Henry I
Shaw, Jr, History ofU.S. Marine Corps operations in
World War II: Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal,
Washington, DC, HQ US Marine Corps, USGPO,
1958, vol. 1, p. 359. See also, The history ofthe
Medical Department ofthe United States Navy in
World War II, Washington, DC, US Government
Printing Office, 1953, vol. I, p. 73.
18 Frank, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 338, 354, 527,
588, 613-14. See also, Miller, op. cit., note 15 above,
pp. 155, 159.
198
1500
1000
0
0
Q
ct
500
0Malaria in American Troops in World War 11
Given the Japanese expertise in medical research up to the 1930s and their excellent
military medical care in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-190519 one can only speculate
about the reasons for their poor military medical record in World War II. Perhaps the
Bushido indoctrination ofthe 1930s included an indifference to medical support as part of
the larger indifference to survival (the Banzai charge, the Kamikaze attacks)-suicide
rather than surrender.
Thus in three important battles malaria was a major cause ofmanpower loss, in the last
two the defeat of the enemy was by no means assured, and (in ironic counterpoint to
Bataan) malaria and starvation eventually destroyed the Japanese forces.
Command Responses
The impact of malaria brought to commanders a new understanding of their role in its
control. Probably the first to recognize this was General Sir Thomas Blaney, Commander-
in-Chief of the Australian Army, during the Owen Stanley Campaign of June to
September 1942.20 In September 1942, he sent Colonel Neil H Fairley, RAAMC and a
tropical medicine and malaria expert, to head a mission to the United States and England.
The need for drugs, netting, insect repellents, malaria control personnel, supplies and
equipment was forcefully presented. In the United States especially, measures were taken
to respond to these requests.2'
Early in the Guadalcanal campaign, no attention was paid to malaria control and there
was essentially no malaria discipline. "The prevailing attitude was expressed by one high
ranking officer who said-we are here to kill Japs and to hell with mosquitoes".22 But in
November 1942, Admiral William F Halsey, Jr, the new Commander SOPAC, began to
introduce small malaria control units. Because of the continuous heavy fighting, they
could work initially only in a very limited rear area. More important was Halsey's
directive of 13 November 1942 on the use of such units: ". . . Commanders of all bases .
. . are enjoined to cooperate to the fullest extent with the officer in charge of Malaria
Control Units .. .". The order further required consultation about "the selection of sites
for camps and airfi'elds". Continued problems with malaria control led to a stronger
directive on 24 September 1943. ". . Island Commanders . . . will require subordinate
units to carry out prescribed control measures . . .". In short, Halsey's attention had been
captured and precise orders went down the chain ofcommand.23
When Eichelburger returned to Australia in January 1943 to command and train new
divisions, he lectured his new commands on the lessons of Buna where lack of
enforcement ofdiscipline was "one ofthe most glaring causes offailure". He believed that
19 See, for example, Charles Lynch, MC, USA, 21 Walker, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 162; Hart and
Reports ofmilitary observers attached to the armies Hardenbergh, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 540.
in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, 22 Quote from, Paul A Harper, Wilbur G Downs,
Washington, DC, USGPO, 1907; Louis J Seaman, Paul W Oman, and Norman Levine, 'New Hebrides,
The real triumph ofJapan, New York, Appleton, Solomon Islands, Saint Matthias Group and Ryukyu
1909. islands', in Preventive medicine in World War II, op.
20 For an excellent account of disease on the cit., note I above, p. 426; Frank, op. cit., note 15
Kokoda Trail, see H D Steward, Recollections ofa above, p. 260.
regimental medical officer, Melbourne University 23 Harper, et al., ibid, pp. 435-7.
Press, 1983. Walker, op. cit., note 1, above, pp.
14-37.
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"nothing important can be left to the individual inclination of the soldier. The taking of
quinine, the care of insect bites ... shaving and bathing, avoidance of sleeping on the
ground are all subjects about which specific instructions must be issued and diligently
enforced".24
MacArthur, on recommendations from Australian and American medical officers, had
established a Combined Advisory Committee on Tropical Medicine, Hygiene and
Sanitation in March 1943, reporting directly to his General Headquarters, SWPA. It was
agreed that Fairley, as the most knowledgeable person, would chair the committee. The
committee began to sponsor research, define problem areas, and prepare directives on
disease control which MacArthur endorsed and issued.25 It should be noted that this was
a staff committee. It had no direct authority over malaria control operations and its
statistical information was only that which could be providedby its members, all ofwhom
held other senior and critical jobs.26
In May 1943, MacArthur was briefed on the malaria incidence by Colonel Paul F
Russell, MC, the American army malaria consultant. MacArthur's response was clear,
"Doctor, this will be a long war iffor every division I have facing the enemy, I must count
on a second division in hospital with malaria and a third division convalescing from this
debilitating disease".27
General George C Kenney, MacArthur's AirCommander, responding to medical advice
on the protective wearing of clothing in November 1942, ran an experiment-one
squadron clothed in long trousers and long sleeved shirts and one squadron in shorts and
short sleeved shirts. At the end of a month there were two cases of malaria in the long
sleeve/trouser squadron and 62 cases in the other. This convinced Kenney and his troops,
"I put out an order requiring everyone in the Fifth Air Force to wearlong trousers and long
sleeves. The evidence was good enough for the kids as well as me".28
General George C Marshall, the magisterial Chief of Staffofthe United States Army in
July 1943 evaluated the resource and command problems as related to the disease losses
of the New Guinea and Guadalcanal campaigns. "Apparently the trouble in the past has
been that priorities for munitions overrode those for the necessary screening and other
material to provide protection at the bases, also there has not been sufficiently rigid
sanitary discipline as to the individual soldier."29 That cogent statement neatly
summarizes the issues.
Thus, by mid-1943, senior army, navy, and air force commanders understood the
problem, had arranged for competent medical advice, had asked for medical help and had
issued appropriate orders about malaria control. That was half of the solution.
24 Jay Luvaas and John F Shortal, 'Robert L 26 Blanche B Armfield, Medical Department,
Eichelberger: MacArthur's fireman', in Leary, op. United States Army, organization and administration
cit., note 6 above, p. 1-22. in World War ll, Washington, DC, Office of the
25 Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, 'Allied cooperation in Surgeon General, USGPO, 1963, pp. 443-5.
malaria prevention and control: the World War II in 27 Paul F Russell, 'Introduction', in Preventive
the Southwest Pacific experience', J. Hist. Med. medicine in World War II, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 2.
Allied Sci., 1991, 46: 493-513; Hart and 28 George C Kenny, General Kenny reports, New
Hardenbergh, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 540; Allan S York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949, p. 125.
Walker, Clinical problems ofwar, Medical Series, 29 Armfield, op. cit., note 26 above, p. 442.
Australia in the War of 1939-45, Canberra,
Australian War Memorial, 1952, p. 99.
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Medical Responses
Beginning in 1940, there was pre-war planning by the army for mosquito vector control
(especially in the United States); for medical intelligence about malaria in potential
combat areas; for the development ofmalaria control teams; for training ofmalariologists
and the education of line officers and troops, and for the development of a civilian
research programme seeking new drugs for prophylaxis and treatment.30
Those programmes directly under medical control (research, medical training, etc.),
began to be implemented.3' Those that required outside support for personnel, money and
equipment were progressing very slowly when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941 precipitated a half-ready United States into war. All attention was now
given to arms and combat troops and combat commanders had no time for mosquitoes.
In spite of Colonel Simmons' post-war statements, the suddenness of the Japanese
assault success in the SWPA and SOPAC in their choice of battlegrounds, and Allied
organizational unpreparedness and confusion meant that line commanders focused first on
war fighting capability. Although the SWPA asked for malaria control units in December
1942, those units were not ready until early 1943. Thus effective malaria control measures
did not begin until mid-1943. For example, malariologists and malaria control units did
not reach New Guinea until March 1943. The pre-war planning had assumed that the
theatre malariologist would be directed by a theatre surgeon reporting directly to the
theatre commander. MacArthur, however, had assigned his theatre surgeon to the Services
of Supply and there was no single medical directing authority for malaria control; the
medical staff was split between logistical and command staffs until January 1944. Even
so, by August 1944, there were 18 malariologists, 32 survey and 55 control units in the
theatre although there was still no overall medical command of these units.32
In SOPAC, a small Malaria and Insect Control Organization was established in
November 1942, headed by a Navy medical officer with pooled resources from the Army
and the Navy. From the beginning, the medical officers in charge reported directly to the
area commander at all levels ofthe command chain. Initially, a Navy medical officer was
in charge; later in the war as the marines moved to the Central Pacific islands, army
medical officers directed the programme. It remained a truejoint programme-the senior
army medical officer noted, "the efficiency and economy ofthisjoint use ofpersonnel and
equipment is a stimulating chapter in combined service organization". In contrast to the
divided authority and organizational chaos of MacArthur's direction of medical staffing,
the malaria control work in SOPAC worked smoothly.33
The malaria control organizations had been approved by the War Department General
Staff in October 1942, and offered by the Surgeon General to theatre commanders that
month. The organization consisted of: a medical officer malariologist as supervisor; a
survey unit (an entomologist, a parasitologist, 11 enlisted technicians); a control unit (a
sanitary engineer and 11 enlisted technicians); locally recruited labour gangs to do control
30 James S Simmons, 'The malaria control program Army in the fight against malaria, 1940-1944', War
of the United States Army during World War II', in and Society, 1995, 13: 91-11 1; Simmons, op. cit.,
Proceedings ofthe Fourth International Congress on note 30 above.
Tropical Medicine and Malaria, Washington, DC, 32 Armfield, op. cit., note 26, pp. 442-50.
USGPO, 1948, vol. I, pp. 827-40. 3 Ibid., pp. 392-6.
31 Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, 'The role of the U.S.
201Robert J TJoy
work, and local area anti-malaria squads of enlisted men for control work in their troop
units.
The survey unit determined the malaria species present, defined the predominant
vectors, assessed the malaria rates in native populations, and did troop and command
education. The control unit directed the drainage, oiling, spraying and otherdestruction of
breeding sites, and trained the labour gangs. A typical organization is given in Table 2.
Personnel training and the assembly of equipment and supplies were complete by
January 1943, and the units began to be shipped to both theatres. Table 3 illustrates the
build up of units in SWPA and SOPAC.34 Control ofthe mosquito vectors in non-combat
areas was done by drainage and ditching to remove breeding sites, by oiling such sites to
kill larvae and by the use of bed nets and screening. Base and airfield sites were located
away from native villages, to avoid them as reservoirs. In a few cases, the villages were
moved if the combat units could be placed at a sufficient distance. These were all well
established techniques used for years. There were three new technologies introduced in
World War II-DDT, the "bug bomb", and DEET insect repellent.
DDT (Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane) had been synthesized in 1874 by Othnian
Zeidler in Vienna as a problem in organic synthesis. Paul Muller ofGeigy Laboratories in
Switzerland re-synthesized it in 1939 and discovered it was a versatile and powerful
insecticide. It was marked in 1940 as Gerasol, an agricultural pesticide and lousicide.35 In
October 1942, it was tested by the US Department of Agriculture Bureau ofEntomology
and Plant Quarantine at its laboratory in Orlando, Florida, as a larvicide, and as a spray
for immediate and residual effects as an adult mosquito killer.36 It entered the Army
supply list in May 1943 and reached the combat theatres in late 1944. It should be noted
that the decrease in malaria rates was not due to the advent ofDDT-it arrived too late to
have a significant impact.37
The aerosol dispenser, "bug bomb", was developed by the USDA Orlando laboratory
in 1941. It was a one pound steel container with pyrethrum oil spray dispersed by Freon-
12 propellant. Extraordinarily useful for killing mosquitoes in closed environments, inside
bed nets, and in aircraft, one bomb would treat 150,000 cubic feet of space. About 35
million were issued during the war.38
Repellent testing of new compounds began in 1941 at the Army's request at the USDA
Orlando laboratory with screening of new compounds from industrial and academic
laboratories. Over 7,000 compounds and mixtures were screened. The final product sent
to the field was a mixture ofdimethyl phthalate (DEET), Rutgers 612 and Induline. There
were (and are) two problems with a repellent applied to the skin-sweating it off and
customer acceptance of an oily mixture. There is no way to evaluate the impact of skin
repellents-or even their use.39
34 Oliver R McCoy, 'War Department provisions Geer, Randall Latta and Arthur W Lindquist, 'The
for malaria control', in Preventive medicine in World dispersal of insecticides', in ibid., pp. 636-45.
War 11, op. cit., note I above, pp. 11-22. 37 Paul F Russell, 'Lessons in malariology from
35 Russell, op. cit., note 27 above, p. 8-9. World War II', Amer. J. Trop. Med., 1946, 26: 5-13.
36 Emory C Cushing, History ofentomology in 38 McCoy, op. cit., note 34 above, pp. 40-1;
World War II, Washington, DC, Smithsonian Cushing, op. cit., note 36 above, pp. 36-7.
Institution, 1957, pp. 28-35; H L Haller and Stanley 39 Roy 0 Scholz, 'The development of new insect
Cristol, 'The development of new insecticides', in E C repellents', in Andrus, op. cit., note 36 above,
Andrus, et al., Advances in military medicine, Boston, pp. 646-51; McCoy, op. cit., note 34 above,
Little, Brown, 1948, vol. II, pp. 621-6; Harriet A pp. 37-9; Cushing, op. cit., note 36 above, pp. 37-8.
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Table 2
Typical Malaria Control Organization
Personnel
Base Control Unit 55
Seabee/Army Engineer Battalion 292
Natives 250
Troop Details 350
Total 1,302
This is the organization required in 1944 to control malaria in 110 square miles of Guadalcanal.
(Source: Paul A Harper, et al., 'New Hebrides, Solomon Islands, Saint Mathias Group and Ryukyu
Islands', in Medical Department, United States Army, Preventive medicine in World War II, vol. VI,
eds John Coates and Ebbe C Hoff, Washington, DC, Office ofthe Surgeon General, USGPO, 1963,
p. 446.)
Table 3
Southwest Pacific Pacific
Feb. 1943 April 1945 Feb. 1943 April 1945
Malariologists 7 24 6 15
Survey Units 3 34 4 18
Control Units 12 70 6 15
The build up of malaria control organizations during the war.
(Source: Oliver T McCoy, 'War Department provisions for malaria control', in Medical Department,
United States Army, Preventive medicine in World War II, vol. VI, eds John B Coates and Ebbe C
Hoff, Washington, DC, Office of the Surgeon General, USGPO, 1963.)
Atabrine
It is obvious that environmental control could not be performed in forward combat
areas (including the use of bed nets). Even with clothing discipline, hands and faces were
exposed, and repellent, even if used, was rapidly removed in the sweat. A
prophylactic/suppressive drug was absolutely necessary for protection against malaria.
Thus, the requirement was to examine prophylactic drug use and select the right drugs in
the right doses and the correct times of administration. Quinine was used, when available,
at Bataan, and initially at Buna and Guadalcanal. However, the Japanese conquest of Java
meant that the source of 95 per cent of the world's quinine was no longer available.
Further, prophylactic quinine had never been particularly successful in Asian hyper-
endemic areas in heavily infected people-which was the military problem.
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Atabrine (mepacrine, quinacrine) and plasmoquine had been synthesized by German
chemists from 1925 to 1932, as part of a programme begun after World War I during
which Germany had been cut off from international sources of quinine.40 Atabrine had
been tested in 1938 by American army investigators in soldiers in Panama for treatment.4'
It had been found superior to quinine but had a side effect of turning the skin yellow and
there were reports ofgastrointestinal symptoms. As a prophylactic it had not been used for
longer than a month, and the dosage and frequency had varied with each trial in studies
conducted in 1934.42
As new trials of atabrine began in 1942, there was concern that American and British
manufacturing processes contained a toxic fraction not in the German product. (The
Germans had not specified all the steps in their synthesis of the drug.) This was soon
found not to be true, and clinical research began to study the dosage and timing ofthe use
of the drug.43
Atabrine was administered sporadically on Guadalcanal and Buna in December 1942.
There was no published doctrine for its use, nor any information on side effects. The unit
medical officers thus invented their own programmes. These ranged from the daily use of
0.1 gramme to twice a week administration of 0.2 grammes, to 0.05 grammes for 5 days
with 2 days of "rest". If a unit medical officer was successful with a particular regimen,
in 1942 and early 1943 there was no system for reporting the data.44
Clearly, order needed to be established and hard data secured. In the United States, the
Office of Scientific Research and Development supported studies in volunteers in prisons
and among conscientious objectors.45 There was close co-ordination with elegant human
trials done by Fairley at a research centre in Cairns, Australia. Here experimental malaria
was transmitted to soldier volunteers by mosquito and by blood transfusion. Atabrine and
other drugs were tested in varying protocols and volunteers were stressed by hard work to
examine drug effect on possible breakthrough of symptoms while on drug prophylaxis.46
The American research was another of the new government-academia-industry consortia
that had developed during the war. The malaria programme was exceptionally successful,
especially in co-ordinating with international research programmes in Australia and Great
Britain.47
The data from the co-ordinated programmes, primarily Fairley's conclusions (turned
into Combined Advisory Committee directives in mid-1943), standardized the dose of
atabrine at 0.1 gramme a day, with a one week "primer" before entering a malarial area.
It was discovered that the dangerous falciparum was suppressed and, if atabrine was
continued after leaving a malarial area, eradicated from the body, resulting in a cure.
40 Pudney, op. cit., note 3 above. 43 George A Carden, Jr, 'Malaria: introduction', in
41 Cleon J Gentzhow and George R Callender, Andrus, et al., op. cit., note 36 above, pp. 665-70.
'Malaria in the Panama Canal Department, United 44 Harper, et al., op. cit., note 22 above, p. 469;
States Army. Results of treatment with quinine, The history ofthe Medical Department, op. cit., note
atabrine and plasmodin', Amer J. Hyg., 1938, 28: 17 above, p. 162.
174-89. 45 James A Shannon, 'The clinical testing of
42 James S Simmons, Malaria in Panama, antimalarial drugs', in Andrus, et al., op. cit., note 36
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1939, p. 265, 268, above, pp. 698-716.
277; William H W Komp and H C Clark, 'A third 46 N Hamilton Fairley, 'Chemotherapeutic
year's observation on malaria in Panama, with suppression and prophylaxis in malaria', Trans. Roy.
special reference to control with atabrine', Amer J. Soc. Trop. Med. Hyg., 1945, 38: 312-65.
Trop. Med; 1934, 14: 381-406. 47 Condon-Rall, op. cit., note 31 above.
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Further, atabrine eliminated the sexual forms offalciparum (these are taken up by the
mosquito bite and perpetuate the cycle, see note 3). Thus troops would not be reservoirs
of infection for this species.48
The story was different with vivax. Atabrine would also suppress this form of malaria
while the drug was taken, but it would not eliminate the organism. This was discovered
when troops were removed from Guadalcanal, sent to non-malarial islands and
suppressive atabrine withdrawn, ". . . in the hope of demalarializing [the division]. The
theory was that if the troops were allowed to have their malaria, they would get it out of
their system. . . ". For example, the US Army Americal Division replaced the marines on
Guadalcanal in early December 1942. Malaria discipline was poor to absent and the
malaria rate was around 1,300/1000. The division was sent to Fiji, a non-malarious island,
in March 1943, and atabrine was stopped. It was a disaster-the division came down en
masse with vivax-by August the malaria rate was 3,700/1000/year and still at 2,800/1000
in October. Atabrine was begun in November-by January 1944 the rate was 43/1000.
The division learned its lesson; in 5 months of combat on Bougainville the rate averaged
112/month.49 In fairness to the medical staff, although a liver phase in avian malaria had
been documented, it was not then known that vivax had a phase in man where it stayed in
the liver and was not susceptible to drugs. This was suspected, but not proved until 1948.50
The first Marine Division after leaving Guadalcanal, and the US Army 32nd Division
after withdrawal from Buna had similar experiences. These divisions were useless for
combat for up to six months.51 It was these data that led General MacArthur to make his
comment to Colonel Russell in May 1943.
The treatment of relapsed vivax malaria was not easily addressed. The sulfonamides,
penicillin, and heavy metals were tried without success. Quinine was indifferently useful,
while plasmochin (pamaquine) and totaquine and other cinchona alkaloids were oflimited
benefit. Long-term administration-for months-of atabrine prophylaxis appeared to
offer the best results in patients with relapsed vivax. Atabrine was not without toxicity,
although the incidence of side effects was quite low. The skin did turn yellow. An
uncommon atabrine dermatitis complex (lichen planus) and a rare case oftoxic psychosis
did occur. All these signs and symptoms cleared on discontinuance of the drug.52
The research programmes in the United States eventually validated early German work
on chloroquine for treatment and prophylaxis53 and developed the drug primaquine, still
useful to eradicate the liver phase ofvivax and thus prevent relapses.54 But during the war
the only answer to vivax was continuous administration of atabrine. Millions of tablets
were shipped-hundreds of thousands of pounds of the drug.
48 Benjamin M Baker, 'The suppression of drugs', inInternial medicine in World WarII, op. cit.,
malaria', in Internal medicine in World War II, op. note 5 above, pp. 525-98.
cit., note 5 above, pp. 465-77. 53 G Robert Coatney, 'Pitfalls in a discovery: the
49 Harper, et al., op. cit., note 22 above, p. 429. chronicle of chloroquine,' Amer. J. Trop. Med. Hyg.
50 PC C Gamham, 'History of discoveries of 1963, 12: 12-8.
malaria parasites and their life cycles', Hist. Phil. 54 Robert C Elderfield, 'The synthesis of
Life Sci., 1988, 10: 93-108. antimalarial drugs', in Andrus, et al., op. cit., note 36
51 Hart and Hardenbergh, op. cit., note 14 above, above, pp. 670-7. See also, Most, op. cit., note 52
p. 568. above, pp. 594-8.
52 Harry Most, 'Clinical trials of antimalarial
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Conclusions
Did all these command directions, research programmes and control efforts eventually
work? In a word-yes. For the SWPA, for example, the malaria rate at Milne Bay in New
Guinea in January 1943 was 3,300/1000/year; in January of 1944 it was 31/1000. For the
entire command the February rate of794/1000 had fallen to 179/1000 in February 1944.55
For the remainder ofthe war malaria rates would increase modestly during active combat,
but never reached the disastrous levels of 1942 and 1943.
The major benefit of malaria control was, of course, the preservation ofthe health and
lives ofthe soldiers and marines, permitting the prosecution ofthe war. Economically, the
logistical and personnel support for hospital beds was markedly reduced. In the SWPA,
intensive atabrine treatment reduced hospital stays from 15 to 6 days per patient. This
reduction, coupled with the overall reduction in attack rates, forestalled the need for about
an additional 10,000 hospital beds.56 The force multiplier ofhealthy troops kept in the line
certainly hastened the defeat of the malaria ridden Japanese57 (see Table 4). But the
Table 4
US Marine Corps and US Navy malaria cases
New cases 113,774
Relapse cases 89,507
Total cases 203,281
Percentage relapsed 78.6
Percentage total to duty 94.0
These statistics are for the period 1942-1945.
(Source: The history ofthe Medical Department ofthe United States Navy in World War II, vol. 3,
Washington, DC, USGPO, 1950, Table I, p. 92.)
medical research and control programmes would have meant nothing without the
understanding, resources and discipline provided by line commanders, who supported and
enforced the environmental and behaviour modification measures.
General Blaney, commanding the Australian army, put it succinctly in an interview
reported by his malariologist in December 1942. He said in part, "No officer was fit to
command in a hyperendemic malarial area who did not realize the menace ofmalaria, and
take every step to prevent it".58
55 Harper, et al., op. cit., note 22 above, p. 578. History, USGPO, 1954, and Robert R Smith,
56 Hart and Hardenbergh, op. cit., note 14 above, Triumph in the Philippines, Washington, DC, Office
pp. 572-8. of the Chief of Military History, USGPO, 1963. See
57 The official histories are: Robert R Smith, The also Allan Millet, Semperfidelis: the history ofthe
approach to the Philippines, Washington, DC, Office United States Marine Corps, New York, Macmillan,
of the Chief of Military History, USGPO, 1953; W 1980, pp. 344-441.
Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: the return to the Philippines, 58 Walker, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 115.
Washington, DC, Office of the Chief of Military
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The best example is from another command, also riddled with malaria. Major General
William Slim, commanding the British 14th Army in Burma wrote: "Good doctors are no
use without good discipline." He described the introduction in 1943 of mepacrine
[atabrine] and individual tests for taking the drug. "I, therefore, had surprise checks of
whole units made, every man being examined. If the overall result was less than ninety-
five percent positive, I sacked the commanding officer. I only had to sack three; by then
the rest had got my meaning".59 His malaria rates markedly decreased.
Lieutenant General Sir Neil Cantlie, who served in India as its senior British medical
officer during the war and later became Director General of the British Army Medical
Service put it very well. He reported a briefing by Fairley to commanders on malaria
control: "One commander said: 'You doctors think you can prevent malaria, but you can't.
I can and I am going to.' When for the first time in history a combatant officer was
considered unfit to command on the grounds that he had allowed his men to become
ineffective through disease, a new day in military medicine dawned."60
59 William Slim, Defeat into victory, London,
Cassell, 1956, p. 180. For a modem analysis see
Mark Harrison, 'Medicine and the culture of
command: the case of malaria control in the British
Army during the two world wars', Med. Hist., 1996,
40: 437-52.
60 Neil Cantlie, 'Health discipline', U.S. Armed
Forces med. J., 1950, 1: 232-8.
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